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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone knows who to call to deal with ghosts,' but when
it comes to a financial crisis, "who ya gonna call?" 2 - the bank
regulators. When the economic crisis threatened to crash the
world banking system, stress testing of financial institutions was
one method used by regulators to prevent disaster by making sure
that banks had sufficient capital. Regulators' stress test program
according to Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, "help[ed] restore confidence in the banking
system" and it "was an important step toward quelling the crisis."'
This Note will analyze stress tests of financial institutions in
the United States and Europe that occurred in response to the
economic crises. Part II will provide a brief background of the
financial crisis in both the United States and Europe. Part III will
discuss American stress testing,' while Part IV will introduce the
European method. Part V will compare the two systems and
analyze their relative effectiveness.9 This Note will demonstrate
that the design used in the United States offers the most effective
1. See GHOSTBUSTERS (Columbia Pictures 1984).
2. Id.
3. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Fed. Reserve Bank of Chicago 46th Annual Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition (May 6, 2010), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke201O0506a.htm
[hereinafter Bernanke May 2010 Speech] (suggesting that the steps taken by
regulators in the United States and abroad prevented a worldwide banking failure in
2008).
4. See id.
5. Id.
6. See infra Part II.
7. See infra Part III.
8. See infra Part IV.
9. See infra Part V.
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option for stress testing because it only requires coordination
within one country and provides for ongoing future stress testing.
This becomes apparent when compared to the European tests and
their failure to properly address factors relevant to its crisis (i.e.
sovereign debt default).'
II. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The current economic crisis has been described as "the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression."' Between 2002
and 2006, American households and financial institutions acquired
enormous amounts of debt, exceeding economic expansion, as the
price of real estate plummeted.12 The United States' economic
crisis peaked in 2008 with the purchase of the collapsed Bear
Stearns by JP Morgan in March, and continued with the fall of
Lehman Brothers and the bailout of AIG in September of that
year.13 In its examination of the U.S. financial system the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) describes what led to the
financial crisis in the United States:
In the years prior, the U.S. economy experienced an
unsustainable lending boom, fueled by low interest
rates and capital inflows from abroad; a housing
bubble; the rapid rise of a "shadow banking
system;" a decline in underwriting standards;
weakness in risk management, governance, and
compensation structures in the financial sector; and
the growing use of complex derivative and
structured credit instruments whose risk properties
10. See infra Part V.
11. Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since '30s, With No End Yet in Sight, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122169431617549947.html
(quoting Mark Gertler, Professor of Economics, New York University).
12. Id.
13. See Frederick Tung, The Great Bailout of 2008-09, 25 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J.
333, 334 (2009); see also Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., Speech at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s Forum on Mortgage
Lending for Low and Moderate Income Households, Arlington, Virginia: Financial
Regulation and Stability (July 8, 2008), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20080708a.htm (describing the
role of the fall of Bear Stearns).
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and contribution to systemic fragility were poorly
understood. These vulnerabilities were allowed to
build as a result of insufficient market discipline but
also because of critical shortcomings and gaps in the
supervisory and regulatory framework, both at a
micro- and macro-prudential level.14
Europe was not immune from the crisis and saw its
financial institutions suffer like their American counterparts. In
England, Northern Rock PLC experienced the first run on a bank
in more than 100 years in September 2007, forcing it to be
nationalized." After Northern Rock PLC's nationalization,
Barclays PLC, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Lloyds also suffered
large losses." The crisis hit Germany as well, with the government
injecting funds into financial institutions, including Germany's
second-largest bank." By December 2007, the European Central
Bank was forced to inject approximately $500 billion into banks
that invested in U.S. subprime mortgages. After those measures
were taken, the economic crisis continued with concern over
Greece's fiscal health because the country held large amounts of
debt relative to economic development.19 Subsequently, Italy,
Portugal, Ireland, and Spain all added to the concern with a similar
imbalance of debt relative to expansion.20 Apprehension over
government bonds fueled the economic crisis in Europe,21 and was
responsible for the Euro falling to $1.19 in June 2010, a four year
low against the Dollar.2 2
14. INT'L MONETARY FUND, IMF COUNTRY REPORT No. 10/247, UNITED STATES:
PUBLICATION OF FINANCIAL SECTOR ASSESSMENT PROGRAM DOCUMENTATION -
FINANCIAL SYSTEM STABILITY ASSESSMENT 5 (2010), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2010/crl0247.pdf.
15. LISSA L. BROOME & JERRY W. MARKHAM, REGULATION OF BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICE ACTIVITIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 986 (4th ed. 2011).
16. Id. at 987.
17. Id. at 994.
18. Id. at 998.
19. Steven Erlanger, Euro Debt Crisis is Political Test for Bloc, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5,2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/06/world/europe/06europe.html.
20. Id.
21. David Enrich, EU Banks Survive Stress Test, WALL ST. J., July 24, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575384940544522582.html.
22. Steven C. Johnson, Euro Recovers vs Dollar, REUTERS (July 23, 2010, 4:14
2011] 335
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
Although many issues led to the worldwide economic crisis,
deficient bank capital was a significant cause.H Stress testing is one
way to confirm that financial institutions are sufficiently
capitalized, and if undercapitalized, provisions may be made to
assure institutions can withstand downturns.
III. STRESS TESTS IN THE UNITED STATES
The United States' campaign to combat the financial crisis
included the passing of the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act,25 enacted on October 3, 2008, which authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to create programs under the Troubled Assets
Relief Program (TARP) to buy troubled assets from financial
institutions.26 One such program under TARP was the Capital
Purchase Program (CPP) where the Treasury provided $205
billion in capital to financial institutions in exchange for senior
preferred shares and warrants for common stock.27 In addition to
the CPP, the Treasury implemented the Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program (SCAP)2 and the Capital Assistance
Program (CAP).29 SCAP, as a part of CAP, required the largest
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6533CI20100723.
23. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Speech at the Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston 54th Economic Conference: Financial
Regulation and Supervision after the Crisis: The Role of the Federal Reserve (Oct.
23, 2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speechlbernanke2009l023a.htm
[hereinafter Bernanke October 2009 Speech].
24. Id.
25. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122
Stat. 3765 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5261).
26. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 §101, 12 U.S.C.A. § 5211
(West 2009).
27. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JULY OVERSIGHT REPORT: SMALL BANKS IN THE
CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM 6, 12-13 (2010), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-071410-report.pdf (requiring financial
institutions participating to pay for the first five years a five percent dividend and
after five years a nine percent dividend).
28. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2009), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090424al.pdf [hereinafter
SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION].
29. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TREASURY WHITE PAPER: THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN 1, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
[Vol. 15336
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bank holding companies to undergo stress testing.30 CAP was
designed as a vehicle to inject additional capital or to convert
investments made though the CPP to mandatorily convertible
preferred shares if additional capital was required during SCAP
stress tests."
CAP was enacted to "[r]estore confidence throughout the
financial system that the nation's largest banking institutions have
a sufficient capital cushion against larger than expected future
losses, should they occur due to a more severe economic
environment, and to support lending to creditworthy borrowers." 32
Similarly, Ben Bernanke stated that there were two purposes for
SCAP; first, to make sure financial institutions had sufficient
capital for losses, and second, to "reduce the uncertainty about
potential losses and earning prospects." 33
A. Provisions
The U.S. programs provided for both the testing of
financial institutions by federal bank regulators4 and the funding
by the U.S. Treasury Department of those institutions unable to
raise necessary capital in the private market.3 ' Regulators
conducted stress tests for the nineteen bank holding companies
with assets over $100 billion. The $100 billion threshold was most
releases/Documents/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY WHITE PAPER].
30. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS 52 (July 2009), available at
http://www.sigtarp.gov/reports/congress/2009/July2009_QuarterlyReport-to-Congre
ss.pdf [hereinafter SIGTARP REPORT].
31. See id. at 53 (explaining CAP and defining MCP as required to be changed
into common stock at a particular time).
32. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, U.S. Treasury Releases Terms of Capital
Assistance Program (Feb. 25, 2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg4O.aspx [hereinafter Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb.
2009].
33. Bernanke May 2010 Speech, supra note 3.
34. See SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, at 1 n.1, 2 ("The
federal bank regulatory agencies that participated in the SCAP are the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve Board System, the Federal Reserve Banks, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency.").
35. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 2.
36. SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, at 1. Ben Bernanke
stated that smaller banks would have capital analyzed as well but not as part of the
2011] 337
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likely chosen because it included nineteen firms that represented
two-thirds of the country's banking assets and half the loans, 3 and
regulators believed that smaller institutions often have more than
38
enough common equity. The tests included two different
economic conditions used by the firms to approximate possible
losses and reserves. 39 The two conditions were referred to as the
"baseline," which emulated current projections for the economy,
and the "more adverse," which assumed a more severe economic
recession.40 Teams of regulators with specific expertise about the
firm or asset class then reviewed the projections and compared
them across firms.4'
The stress tests analyzed the capital positions of the
financial institutions, determined whether they would be able to
absorb any further economic decline,42 and placed a particular
focus on the makeup of an institution's Tier 1 capital.43 CAP was
available to offer preferred security capital to those institutions
that had participated in the stress test as well as smaller, non-
participating institutions that were unable to raise capital in the
private market." An institution that required additional capital
stress test for "logistical reasons." Bernanke May 2010 Speech, supra note 3.
37. See SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, at 1.
38. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: STRESS TESTING AND
SHORING UP BANK CAPITAL 14 (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-060909-report.pdf.
39. SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, at 4 (stating that
institutions were asked to estimate loses on "loans, securities, and trading positions,
as well as pre-provision net revenue (PPNR) and the resources available from the
allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL)").
40. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE SUPERVISORY CAPITAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM: OVERVIEW OF RESULTS 1, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20090507al.pdf
[hereinafter SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS] (stating that both conditions were meant
to portray a possibility and unlikely for either to be the exact path of the economy).
41. See SCAP DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 28, at 4, 10 (stating that
150 people reviewed the bank submissions including senior examiners, economists,
and financial analysts).
42. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32 (stating that the
regulators will check financial institutions' capital needs).
43. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 2. Tier 1 capital is defined as
the core capital elements of stockholder's equity, noncumulative perpetual preferred
stock, and minority interest in each minus "goodwill, other intangible assets, interest-
only strips receivables, deferred tax assets, nonfinancial investments ..... 12 C.F.R.
§ 225 app. A (2011).
44. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 2 & n.2 (allowing those
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after testing had six months to obtain sufficient capital from either
the private market or through CAP funding.45 If unable to obtain
capital through the private market, an institution would apply to
its federal regulator for access to CAP funds.4
B. Results
Results from the stress tests were better than expected.47
Of the nineteen firms tested, nine were found to be sufficiently
capitalized and required no additional capital.4 8 The remaining ten
firms required additional capital totaling $185 billion at the end of
2008, but after taking into account the companies' financing
activities in the first quarter of 2009, the increase in capital
required was only $75 billion.49 Most of the firms had sufficient
Tier 1 capital but required additional Tier 1 common capital.50 The
firms requiring additional capital were: Bank of America,
Citigroup, Fifth Third Bancorp, GMAC, KeyCorp, Morgan
Stanley, PNC, Regions Financial Corporation, SunTrust, and
Wells Fargo & Company." The losses of all the firms from the
institutions not taking part in the stress test, because they did not have assets more
than $100 billion, to nevertheless increase capital through CAP).
45. TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 2.
46. U.S. Treasury Dep't, Capital Assistance Program: Summary of Mandatorily
Convertible Preferred Stock ("Convertible Preferred") Terms, 1,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/tg4O captermsheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
47. See David Enrich et al., Fed Sees Up to $599 Billion in Bank Losses, WALL ST.
J., May 8, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124172137962697121.html (stating
that results of capital needs were less than some had expected).
48. Id. The nine firms that passed the test without needing additional capital
were: American Express, Branch Banking & Trust, Bank of New York Mellon,
Capital One, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan Chase, MetLife, State Street, and U.S.
Bancorp. See SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 9 (listing firms that did
not require any additional capital in Table 3: Supervisory Capital Assessment
Program Estimates for 19 Participating Bank Holding Companies).
49. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 3.
50. Id. at 3 (suggesting that the firms required additional common stockholder
equity); SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 30, at 55 ("T[ier] 1 Common [Capital] . . . is
calculated by removing all non-common elements from T[ier]1, e.g., preferred equity,
minority interests, and trust preferred securities.").
51. Id. at 9 (stating total required addition to capital was $75 billion and by firm
in billions: Bank of America $33.9; Citigroup $5.5; Fifth Third Bancorp $1.1; GMAC
$11.5; KeyCorp $1.8; Morgan Stanley $1.8; PNC $0.6; Regions Financial Corporation
$2.5; Sun Trust $2.2; and Wells Fargo & Company $13.7).
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"adverse" scenario were estimated at $600 billion and mostly
attributable to losses from consumer loans.52 This loss corresponds
to a loan loss rate greater than experienced during the Great
Depression."
On November 9, 2009, six months after the SCAP results
were released, the U.S. Treasury announced that the second
provision of CAP, providing preferred security capital, would be
closed without any investments being made because financial
institutions were able to gain private financing.5 4 However, one
company that could not privately raise capital, GMAC, did not tap
into CAP funds but did receive assistance from the government
through TARP Automotive Industry Financing."
C. Economic Reaction
Stress tests, as the purpose suggests, were designed to
increase confidence in the banking system by determining if there
was sufficient capital in the system to absorb expected losses or if
more needed to be raised. To determine whether the tests
accomplished this purpose, the market reaction to the testing must
be analyzed.
Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner made statements the
day before the release of the tests that the results were
"reassuring,"" and the Dow Jones Industrial Average increased
102 points. 8 The next day, when the results were released,
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 7 (demonstrating that it was the largest loss rate since 1920).
54. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Dep't, Treasury Announcement Regarding the
Capital Assistance Program (Nov. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg359.aspx [hereinafter
Press Release, U.S. Treasury Nov. 2009] (stating that none of the institutions
required financing on November 9, 2009 when CAP closed except for GMAC that
obtained funds from TARP Automotive Industry Financing).
55. Id.; see also Sewell Chan, TARP Oversight Panel Finds Fault With GMAC
Bailouts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/11/business/11tarp.html.
56. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32 (stating the
purpose of the Capital Assistance Program).
57. Jim Puzzanghera & E. Scott Reckard, Big Banks' 'Stress Test' Results to be
Eeassuring, Geithner Says, L.A. TIMEs (May 7, 2009),
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/may/07/business/fi-stress-tests7.
58. Id.
[Vol. 15340
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however, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed down 102
points awaiting the results of the stress tests given after the market
closed. 9 Since the tests were completed, the capital positions of
the firms tested have improved by raising additional capital in
excess of that required by the tests while also enjoying increases in
stock prices.6 Similarly, of the nine institutions found not to need
additional capital, eight had been approved and repaid the CPP
funds just over a year after the stress test results were announced.61
D. Criticism
Following the release of the SCAP stress test results in the
United States, critics attacked the economic presumptions of the
scenarios.62 Some believe the presumptions, which were designed
to demonstrate a worsening economy, were not sufficiently
severe.63  Although the assumptions projected more severe
conditions than anything since the Great Depression,6 critics felt
that the adverse presumptions were not much more severe than
*65
current economic conditions.
One such criticism was the unemployment rate assumed in
the adverse test of 10.3% was not much worse than the 8.9%
actual unemployment rate in April 2009.66 A little over a year
59. Alexandra Twin, Wall Street Takes a Step Back: Stocks Retreat from a Two-
Month Rally as Investors Prepared for Bank Report Cards, CNNMONEY (May 8,
2009, 4:35AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/05/07/markets/markets-newyork/index.htm?postversion=
2009050716.
60. See Bernanke May 2010 Speech, supra note 3 (discussing the institutions
tested a year later).
61. SIGTARP REPORT, supra note 30, at 53.
62. Theo Francis, Stress Test Losers: Bofa, Wells Fargo, GMAC, BLOOMBERG
Bus. WK., (May 7, 2009, 7:04 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/content/may2009/db2009057_743370.h
tm.
63. See id.
64. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 6-7.
65. See Francis, supra note 62.
66. Edmund L. Andrews, Ailing Banks Need $75 Billion, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMEs,
May 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/08/business/08stress.html; see News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, The Employment Situation:
Apr. 2009 (May, 8, 2009),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082009.htm (stating
unemployment in April 2009 was 8.9%).
2011] 341
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after the tests were conducted, the unemployment rate in October
2009 reached 10.1%, approaching the adverse assumption of the
test.6 ' Although the actual unemployment rate neared the adverse
assumption in 2009, the unemployment assumption was still higher
than that ever seen in the United States.8
Additionally, the adverse scenario included more cautious
assumptions for the GDP growth rate in 2009 and unemployment
in 2010 compared to the projections made by the IMF.69 In 2009
the stress test adverse scenario had GDP growth rate at -3.3%
while the IMF projected a -2.8% GDP growth and unemployment
in the adverse scenario for 2010 was 10.3% and the IMF prediction
was 10.1%.'o However, the IMF was more conservative in its
projection of 2010 GDP of 0% while the adverse scenario had a
0.5% GDP growth rate.
Observers also criticized potential loan loss presumptions,
but upon review, it is apparent that the potential losses
demonstrated sufficiently severe presumptions.7 2 The estimated
loan loss of $600 billion resulted in a loan loss rate of 9.1% of total
loans. This loan loss rate would be the largest seen since 1920.74
The stress tests also included new accounting rules not yet in effect
requiring assets such as special-purpose vehicles to be included on
the balance sheet yielding a more cautious result.
Additional suggestions arose when Eric Talley and Johan
Walden, professors at the University of California at Berkeley,
67. U.S. Dep't of Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, Labor Force Statistics from
the Current Population Survey http://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#unemp
(follow "Most Requested series" hyperlink; place a checkmark next to
"Unemployment Rate - Civilian Labor Force - LNS14000000; then follow "Retrieve
data" button).
68. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 7; see also U.S. Dep't of
Labor Bureau of Labor Statistics, supra note 67 (showing that thankfully, the
unemployment rate remained below 10% for 2010).
69. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 38, atl8.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. But see Andrews, supra note 66 (stating that the presumptions were intended
to be "unlikely" but the present situation is only slightly better, while maintaining
that the loan loss rate assumed in the test was the highest since 1921).
73. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 6-7.
74. Id. at 7.
75. CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 38, at 16.
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were asked by the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP) to
analyze the stress tests." Although generally their report points
out that they found the "risk modeling approach has, on the whole,
been a reasonable and conservative one."77  However, the
professors were concerned about the inability to replicate the tests
because of "a lack of transparency in the way the models were
applied."78 The COP also recommended more transparency and
suggested the tests provide specific results for the baseline
scenario.7 Another concern raised by the professors was
specifying capital requirements over a two year period, which
could have been improved by conducting a longer than two year
stress test for non-liquid assets maturing in the long term or
reexamining them as they are closer to maturity.80
E. Additional Stress Testing
Under the newly passed Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), stress testing will
82be an integral part of banking regulation in the United States.
Dodd-Frank requires that the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors create regulations to govern future stress testing in the
United States.8 ' These forthcoming regulations will be developed
76. Id. at 31 (identifying Professor Talley as a professor at the U.C. Berkeley
School of Law and Professor Walden as a professor U.C. Berkeley Haas School of
Business).
77. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Eric Talley & Johan Walden, The Supervisory Capital
Assessment Program: An Appraisal 2 (2009), available at
http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-060909-report.pdf (annex to section one of
report)).
78. Id. at 33.
79. Id. at 5.
80. Id. at 36.
81. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
82. See id. § 165(i), (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (providing for stress tests
of banks).
83. See MAYER BROWN LLP, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FINANCIAL REFORM
LEGISLATION: THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT 22 (2010), available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/doddfrank-act/article.asp?id=9360&nid=13007
(suggesting that implementation of the bill will require input from regulatory
agencies).
2011] 343
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under the framework set out in Dodd-Frank.8
Some of the key provisions within this framework include
annual tests of bank holding companies with assets greater than or
equal to $50 billion15 and possible regulation of non-bank
companies if they are "'predominantly engaged in financial
activities."86 A non-bank company is "predominantly engaged in
financial activities" if 85% or more of its assets come from
activities defined as "financial in nature" by the Bank Holding
Company Act of 1956" or has ownership of "insured depository
institutions" and is determined to be systemically significant by the
Financial Stability Oversight Council established by Dodd-Frank."
These provisions will result in an increase in the companies that
will be tested compared to the number tested as part of SCAP,
because the threshold of assets to be included in testing was cut in
89half and can include non-banking companies. Subsequent testing
will consist of at least three different economic assumptions:
"baseline, adverse, and severely adverse."9 Dodd-Frank also
provides that the Board of Governors has the discretion to test
non-bank financial companies and bank holding companies in
addition to those with assets greater than $50 billion that are
required to be tested.9' Finally, to reach the goal of increasing
confidence in the system, summaries of the tests will be made
public.92
Institutions subject to stress testing by the Board of
Governors will be required to test themselves twice a year and
present the results to the Board of Governors and the institution's
main federal regulator.93 Institutions with assets greater than $10
84. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
85. Id. § 165(i)(1)(A), (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
86. See id. at § 102, 124 Stat. at 1392 (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. §5311).
87. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(n)(2) (2006).
88. Dodd-Frank Act §§ 102, 113, (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. §§ 5311, 5323).
89. See id. §165, 124 Stat. at 1423 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365) (stating a
threshold of $50 billion).
90. Id. § 165(i)(1)(B) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. Id. at § 165(i)(2) (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5365); MAYER BROWN LLP,
supra note 83, at 26. Shortly before the passing of Dodd-Frank, Ben Bernanke stated
the importance of banks stress testing themselves in order to determine if they have
sufficient capital. Bernanke May 2010 Speech, supra note 3.
[Vol. 15344
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billion that are overseen by a "primary Federal financial
regulatory agency" will also carry out annual self-testing.94
Regulatory agencies will create many of the regulations of self-
testing and must make a summary of results public." Much of the
legislation for stress testing requires input from regulators to
establish the structure going forward, which will take some time to
implement. 96
In addition to requirements under Dodd-Frank, the
Federal Reserve "encouraged" the nineteen participants of SCAP
to file capital plans with it by January 7, 2011.9 A "comprehensive
capital plan" should include a stress testing plan to approximate
capital requirements based on what management foresees in terms
of revenues and losses as well as the capital required to weather
the predictions including a baseline and adverse scenarios. The
Federal Reserve will evaluate a financial institution's plan based
on the "firm's risk profile, the regulatory capital standards
applicable today, and the reasonableness of the [bank holding
company's] plans to address anticipated future standards,
including Basel III 99 and relevant aspects of Dodd-Frank."'" Firms
are also required to check with the Federal Reserve before
undertaking anything that "could result in a diminished capital
base.,,io
94. Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i)(2)(A) (to be codified as 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
95. Id. § 165(i)(2)(C) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
96. See MAYER BROWN LLP, supra note 83, at 7.
97. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., REVISED TEMPORARY
ADDENDUM TO SR LETTER 09-4: DIVIDEND INCREASES AND OTHER CAPITAL
DISTRIBUTIONS FOR THE 19 SUPERVISORY CAPITAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM BANK
HOLDING COMPANIES 1 (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg2OlOlll7bl.pdf
[hereinafter REVISED TEMPORARY ADDENDUM TO SR LETTER 09-4].
98. Id. at 2.
99. See Natsuko Waki & Catherine Bosley, Global Regulators Agree on Tougher
Basel III Bank Rules, REUTERS, Sept. 12, 2010, available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE68Bl6L20100912 (stating that Basel III is an
international agreement among central banks on the amount of capital that banks
must hold).
100. REVISED TEMPORARY ADDENDUM TO SR LETTER 09-4, supra note 97, at 3.
101. Id. at 1, 3 (stating examples of such activities to be issuing dividends and
repurchasing stock and that none of these activities should be undertaken before
repayment or replacement of government investments).
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IV. STRESS TESTS IN EUROPE
Much like the United States, the European Union
conducted stress testing of its financial institutions. In 2009, the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) conducted
stress tests to inform policy makers, with the outcomes kept
confidential.'02 CEBS was charged with conducting a second round
of stress testing of European banks in coordination with their
home countries in mid 2010.0 The purpose of the recent 2010
European tests was "to provide policy information for assessing
the resilience of the EU Banking system to possible adverse
economic developments and to assess the ability of banks in the
exercise to absorb possible shocks on credit and market risks,
including sovereign risks."'0
A. Provisions
In mid-2010, CEBS conducted stress tests on ninety-one
banks in twenty-seven countries with projections for the years 2010
and 2011.10' The criterion for selecting banks for testing was to
have more than half of all banking assets of each country covered
through the stress test.10o In total 65% of the European banking
assets were covered by the tests.'" The testing included two sets of
economic assumptions, "benchmark," based on interim forecasts
of the economy by the European Union Commission, and
"adverse," based on European Central Bank estimates with a
102. Press Release, Comm. Of European Banking Supervisors, CEBS's Statement
on Stress Testing Exercise (May 12, 2009), available at http://www.c-ebs.org/News--
Communications/Archive/2009/CEBS-statement-on-stress-testing-exercise.aspx
[hereinafter Press Release, CEBS May 2009.
103. See Dave Kansas & David Enrich, European Banks Brace for Stress Tests,
WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487034673045753827727755355 4.html.
104. COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS, AGGREGATE OUTCOME OF
THE 2010 EU WIDE STRESS TEST EXERCISE COORDINATED BY CEBS IN
COOPERATION WITH THE ECB 1 (2010), available at http://stress-test.c-
ebs.org/documents/Summaryreport.pdf [hereinafter CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME].
105. Id. at 2-3 (Testing was done in banks across twenty countries with seven
additional counties having more than half of banking assets covered through
subsidiaries of the original twenty countries).
106. Id. at 2.
107. Id.
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separate "sovereign risk shock."0  The tests assumed that
exposure to both market and credit risk would not increase over
the stress test period.'" Banks found to be deficient were
responsible for addressing the deficiency with their country's
respective regulator "within a given period of time.""o In addition
to the stress tests, the European Union created a fund, the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), to assist member
countries experiencing trouble obtaining bond financing."'
B. Results
Of the ninety-one banks tested only seven were classified
as deficient under the "adverse" scenario, requiring an increase in
reserves of £3.5 billion."2 A failure was defined as having Tier 1
capital fall below 6%." Five Spanish banks, one German bank,
and one Greek bank failed the "adverse" scenario with "sovereign
shock."114 The German and Greek banks were both nationalized,
and one of the five Spanish banks was taken over by the Bank of
Spain."' The four remaining Spanish banks, if unable to raise
capital in the private sector, have the ability to receive financing
from the government.H6
Total loss under the "adverse" scenario with "sovereign
shock" would amount to £565.9 billion, which is a loss rate of
108. Id. at 3. Sovereign risk was treated differently in each country based on the
individual country's circumstances. Id. at 16.
109. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 4.
110. See id.
111. Anousha Sakoui, EU Rescue Fund Wins Top Credit Rating, FIN. TIMES, Sept.
20,2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s//a291526a-c491-1ldf-bcll-
00144feab49a.html#axzzlCZlg3raM.
112. Enrich, supra note 21. 63.5 billion = $4.5 billion. YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-converter/#from=EUR;to=USD;amt= 3 5000 000 00
(exchange rate on July 23, 2010) (last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
113. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 6, 35 (stating that this
standard differs from most countries' regulatory requirement for Tier 1 capital).
114. Country by Country: EU Bank Stress Test Results, WALL ST. J., (July 23, 2010,
12:58 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatchl2010/07/23/country-by-country-eu-bank-
stress-test-results/ (noting the banks that failed were: Hypo Real Estate Group
(Germany), ATEBank (Greece), Unnim (Spain), Diada (Spain), Espiga (Spain),
Banca Civica (Spain) and Cajasur (Spain)).
115. Enrich, supra note 21.
116. Id.
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2.01%.11' Under this most severe scenario, seven banks were
found not to have sufficient capital in 2011, measured by the 6%
target. Without taking "sovereign shock" into account five
banks would fall below the test threshold by 2011, and only one
falling below in 2010."9 No banks fell under the 6% threshold
120
under the "benchmark" scenario.
In contrast to the 2009 tests, the results were released for
the 2010 tests.121 The results of the 2009 tests were only shared on
an aggregated basis and reported that no bank required additional
capital in either of the two scenarios, "baseline" and "more
adverse," and that total losses over 2009 and 2010 could be
approximately £400 billion.1 22 In addition to the losses predicted in
the testing, the EFSF in November 2010 agreed to grant Ireland
£17.7 billion as part of a total financing package made available to
Ireland of £85 billion from the EFSF, EU, and IMF.123
C. Economic Reaction
When the results of the stress tests were initially released,
the Euro fluctuated against the Dollar and the Dow Jones
Industrial Average declined.124  However, upon analyzing the
monetary and market indicators, the response by the market was
117. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 6, 32. 6565.9 billion =
$730.3 billion. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-
converter/#from=EUR;to=USD;amt=565900000000 (exchange rate on July 23, 2010)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
118. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 24.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Press Release, CEBS May 2009, supra note 102 (stating that the 2009 tests
would not be shared).
122. Press Release, Comm. Of European Banking Supervisors, CEBS's Press
Release on the Results of the EU-Wide Stress Testing Exercise, 1-3 (Oct. 1, 2009),
available at http://www.c-ebs.org/getdoc/629d8941-3f2a-4a7c-al80-
c68208f8b005/CEBS-2009-180-Annex-2-(Press-release-from-CEBS).aspx. E400
billion = $581 billion. YAHOO! FINANCE, http://finance.yahoo.com/currency-
converter/#from=EUR;to=USD;amt=400000000000 (exchange rate on Oct. 1, 2009)
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011).
123. Press Release, European Fin. Stability Facility, EU and EFSF Funding Plans
to Provide Financial Assistance for Ireland (Dec. 21, 2010), available at
http://www.efsf.europa.eu/mediacentre/news/2010/2010-006-eu-and-efsf-funding-
plans-to-provide-financial-assistance-for-ireland.htm.
124. Enrich, supra note 21.
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positive with the euro appreciating and the Dow Jones Industrial
Average increasing 102 points. 125  On Monday, July 26, 2010,
European markets reacted positively. 26  The UK FTSE index
gained thirty-nine points,127 and the German Stock Market DAX
index lost seven points.'" Because of the limited effect, the news
release was described by analysts as a "non-event."129 With respect
to the EFSF, all three major credit rating agencies gave it the
highest possible rating in September 2010, demonstrating their
confidence. 30
D. Criticism
Much of the criticism of the European Union test focuses
on the structure of the tests with respect to sovereign debt and
excluding government debt that institutions planned to keep until
maturity."' This criticism arose even though the European tests
had a specific scenario addressing "sovereign risk shock."" 2 The
European tests analyzed the effects sovereign risk had on a bank's
trading of government bonds in the market from their decreased
value without analyzing bonds that a bank planned to hold to
maturity.' This is especially troubling because uncertainty as to
125. Id.
126. See Neil Shah, Wait-and-See After Europe Stress Test, WALL ST. J. (July 26,
2010, 7:11 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/07/26/wait-and-see-after-
europe-stress-test/ (describing the European market reaction to the stress tests).
127. YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EFTSE+Historical+Prices (last visited Oct. 11,
2010).
128. YAHOO! FINANCE,
http://finance.yahoo.com/q/hp?s=%5EGDAXI+Historical+Prices (last visited Oct.
11, 2010).
129. See Shah, supra note 126 (describing the European market reaction to the
stress tests).
130. Press Release, European Fin. Stability Facility, Rating Agencies Assign Top
Credit Rating to EFSF (Sept. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.efsf.europa.eulmediacentrelnews/2010/2010-003-rating-agencies-assign-
top-credit-rating-to-efsf.htm (stating that Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch give
the EFSF their highest ratings).
131. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 21 (raising the issue that the tests did not take
into account country defaults on debt).
132. See CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 3 (describing the
different scenarios of the test including sovereign risk).
133. Enrich, supra note 21 (explaining "sovereign shock" in the test with country
default); see also Hao Li, Only 7 Banks Fail EU Stress-Test, but Criteria Lacks Vigor,
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whether Greece would be able to meet its debt obligations
aggravated the financial crisis in Europe.1 34 Many have criticized
the failure of the European tests to fully take sovereign debt
115default into consideration.
Additional criticism of the European tests was the inability
to predict future problems actually experienced by the banks
tested."' The European Commissioner for Economic and
Financial Affairs, Olli Rehn, conceded that there were issues with
the last set of tests saying "[t]here was some variety in terms of
rigor and application of these tests.',13 7 Although all of Ireland's
banks passed the tests, they continue to struggle.38
E. Additional Stress Testing
To ensure that financial institutions can withstand future
economic decline, CEBS will periodically stress test banks in the
European Union.'39 In the future, CEBS will "test[] the resilience
of the EU banking sector by means of periodic EU wide and
thematic risk assessments and stress testing exercises, and will
continue its work on improving convergence in supervisory
practices across Europe by addressing the topics both from a
policy and practical perspective." 40 The new European Banking
Authority (EBA) will conduct another round of stress testing in
the first half of 2011.14' The results of the new tests will be made
INT'L Bus. TIMES, July 23, 2010,
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/37972/20100723/only-7-banks-fail-eu-stress-test-but-
criteria-lacks-vigor.htm (criticizing the test's failure to account for sovereign default).
134. See Adam Bradbery, EU Regulators Call Tests Rigorous but Ignore Sovereign
Default, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703294904575385012830206190.html
(highlighting the failure to test for sovereign default in the face of the instability of
Greece and other countries).
135. E.g., Li, supra note 133.
136. See David Enrich & Stephen Fidler, Plans for New EU 'Stress Tests' Spur
Squabbling, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703994904575646903413631856.html.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 7, 35 (providing no definite
period for testing).
140. Id. at 7.
141. Press Release, European Banking Authority, The European Authority Up
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public and available in the middle of 2011.142 A difference from
CEBS is that the EBA will have the power to create rules
enforceable across the EU and will be able to arbitrate between
-143
regulators of various countries.
CEBS has also published guidelines to assist members in
stress test methodology and expects them to be adopted by
member country regulators by the end of 2010.'44 These guidelines
require self stress tests within an institution, with its management
having "ultimate responsibility," and regulators are to verify an
institution's adherence.145 The guidelines do not cover
"supervisory stress testing," rather they concentrate on individual
firm tests. 46
V. COMPARING STRESS TESTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE
There are many similarities between the United States and
Europe in conducting stress tests of banks, but upon examining the
differences, it is apparent that the United States, by not having to
coordinate with various governments, had a much easier time
performing stress testing than Europe. The United States also has
a more definite future testing process enacted by Dodd-Frank.47
The purposes of the stress tests in the United States and the
European Union were similar; both emphasized the aim to
weather further economic trouble.'" The ability to survive was
accomplished by checking financial institutions' capital level. 4 9
and Running and Preparing New EU-Wide Stress Test (Jan. 13, 2011), available at
http://www.eba.europa.eulNews--Communications/Year/2011/The-European-
Banking-Authority-up-and-running-and-.aspx.
142. Id.
143. Enrich & Fidler, supra note 136
144. COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING SUPERVISORS, CEBS GUIDELINES ON STRESS
TESTING 6 (2010), available at http://www.c-
ebs.org/documents/Publications/Standards---Guidelines/2010/Stress-testing-
guidelines/STGuidelines.aspx (hereinafter CEBS GUIDELINES ON STRESS TESTING].
145. Id. at 7.
146. Id. at 4-5.
147. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
148. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32 (describing
purpose of Capital Assistance Program); CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note
104, at 1 (describing purpose of EU stress test).
149. Bernanke May 2010 Speech, supra note 3; COMM. OF EUROPEAN BANKING
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The provisions for the tests were also similar, with both
analyzing banks in light of hypothetical economic scenarios and
both using a baseline and adverse scenario, so as to determine
their ability to survive a downturn in the market.5 o Both the
United States and Europe tested a majority of their respective
banking assets.15 1
As previously discussed, the "sovereign risk" scenario in
the European Union tests were highly criticized because of their
failure to account for sovereign default, a major concern in the
European Union.52 Although the EFSF provides some
reassurance in terms of sovereign default risk, the stress tests
should still account for the risk of holding sovereign debt to
maturity.15 ' One explanation for excluding it is that "[r]egulators
and political leaders sparred over whether to include a default
scenario."154 Regulators chose not to include a default scenario
"partly because they said that a sovereign default was unlikely and
partly due to worries that it would send the wrong political
message.""' This highlights the difficulty encountered in Europe
because CEBS had to work with regulators in twenty countries to
reach an agreement.5 Another example of the difficulty
encountered in Europe was the disagreement among the nations
on what time to release the stress tests results."' In comparison,
the United States had to coordinate with only one government.
SUPERVISORS, CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 1.
150. See SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 1-2; CEBS AGGREGATE
OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 1.
151. SCAP OVERVIEW OF RESULTS, supra note 40, at 1; CEBS AGGREGATE
OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 2.
152. See Bradbery, supra note 134 (pointing out the failure to test for sovereign
default with the effect Greece and other countries' instability had on the market).
153. See Sakoui, supra note 111 (noting that the EFSF is AAA rated showing the
confidence in the fund).
154. See Enrich, supra note 21.
155. Id.
156. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 2 (stating that testing was
done in banks across twenty countries with seven additional counties having more
than half of banking assets covered through subsidiaries of the original twenty
countries).
157. See Kansas & Enrich, supra note 103 (stating that nations disagreed about
timing because stock markets outside of Europe would be able to trade).
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Both the United States and Europe stress tests involved
potential capital assistance but differed in their application and
utilization.1' As part of the CAP, the United States had funding
available for application if a bank needed capital and was unable
to secure it in the private sector."'9 Not one U.S. bank needed to
take advantage of this funding source.16 The EFSF, however,
operated independently from the CEBS that administered the
stress tests.1' As an independent corporation, it could offer
funding to member states by selling bonds rather than investing in
banks.162 Although the funding structures differed, both systems
aimed to address issues at the heart of their respective financial
crises.1 63 The United States, which was shocked by weakened and
failed financial institutions,164 provided for the recapitalization of
banks ' while Europe's crisis, which was most recently
exacerbated by the fear of instability in governments' ability to
repay debt (sovereign default),'6 would be corrected by issuing
bonds for member countries.167
Finally, the last major difference lies in the future of stress
testing. According to the CEBS, the organization will periodically
test banks throughout Europe.'" One future test has been
announced by the EBA for the first half of 2011.69 The United
States, on the other hand, has enacted comprehensive legislation
requiring stress testing of banks by regulators as well as self-
testing.7 o Although the United States legislation has not yet been
implemented, the statute offers a regulatory framework for future
158. See supra Parts III.A, IV.A.
159. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32.
160. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Nov. 2009, supra note 54.
161. See The European Financial Stability Facility - FAQ, EUROPEAN FIN.
STABILITY FACILITY, 1-2, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachment/faq-en.pdf (last
visited Jan. 28, 2010).
162. See id.
163. See supra Part II.
164. See Tung, supra note 13, at 334.
165. See TREASURY WHITE PAPER, supra note 29, at 1.
166. Enrich, supra note 21.
167. See The European Financial Stability Facility - FAQ, supra note 161, at 1-2.
168. CEBS AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 7, 35.
169. Press Release, European Banking Authority, supra note 141.
170. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203, § 165(i), 124 Stat. 1376, 1430 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
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stress testing.171 The United States has a legislative mandate with
definite regularity in its application. This framework helps satisfy
the purpose of the original CAP, to "restore confidence
throughout the financial system that the nation's largest banking
institutions have a sufficient capital cushion against larger than
expected future losses."'7 2 Europe, having only one test scheduled
in the future requires significant strides to assure that testing is
conducted regularly in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
Analyzing the provisions, results, economic reaction,
criticism, and plans for future testing demonstrate that the United
States had an easier time conducting stress tests of their financial
institutions to address concerns of the U.S. financial crisis
compared to the European tests that did not sufficiently address
the issues at the forefront of the European crisis - risk of sovereign
default.173 Both the United States and European stress tests were
responses to the economic crisis that threatened the global
economy.74 Comparing the experience of the United States and
Europe in stress testing their financial institutions demonstrates
the shortcomings of the EU test and provides recommendations
for future testing in both systems. Europe's attempt, albeit
unsuccessful, to address sovereign risk through the use of a
"sovereign risk shock" scenario can assist the development of
future tests to incorporate that risk.
Although the tests results have aided policy makers, future
testing is important to future stability.175  Europe has future
guidelines for self-testing, and each country is "expect[ed]" to
adopt them as part of their regulations by the end of 2010.
Europe also has plans to implement new stress tests in the first
part of 2011 administered by the new EBA, but there are still
171. See id.
172. Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32.
173. See supra Parts II, IV.D.
174. See Press Release, U.S. Treasury Feb. 2009, supra note 32; CEBS
AGGREGATE OUTCOME, supra note 104, at 1.
175. See Dodd-Frank Act § 165(i), (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365).
176. CEBS GUIDELINES ON STRESS TESTING, supra note 144, at 6.
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many unanswered questions about the tests and the future of the
EBA.177 In the future, the creation of a more powerful European
Union Bank Regulator will hopefully ease the difficulty in
coordinating a multi-nation test of financial institutions, which the
United States has not had to bear.
ALEXANDER ABRAMOVICH
177. See Enrich & Fidler, supra note 136.
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